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APPEALS NUMBER 930276-CA 
Case Number 914903785 DA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE CECELIA BEA SCAFIDE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (h) of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended and Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In his opening brief, the Defendant, James Wayne Scafide, 
presented the following two issues for review by the Court of 
Appeals. The appropriate standard of review is stated below for 
each issue. 
1. Error in Not Granting the Defendant Relief from the 
Judament and Decree of Divorce. The trial court's determination 
that a party is not entitled to relief from a judgment will not be 
upset on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Gardiner 
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& Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982), Russell v. 
Martelf 681 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1984), Baker v. Western Surety Company, 
757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1988) and Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons 
Companyr 817 P.2d 382 ( Utah App. 1991). 
2. Improper Application of the Time Limit Set Forth in Rule 
60fbUl) through 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
determinative standard for resolution of this issue is also an 
abuse of discretion. The cases cited, Gardiner & Gardiner Builders 
v. Swapp, Russel v. Martel, Baker v. Western Surety Company and 
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Companyr infra. are authoritative 
on this issue. 
DETERMINATIVE RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The interpretation of Rule 60(b)(1) through 60(b)(7) is also 
believed to be determinative of the matter on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff Cecelia Scafide (nka Cecelia Coggins) filed for 
a divorce from her husband on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. The Defendant and the Plaintiff agreed upon all 
relevant issues and the Defendant directed the Plaintiff to retain 
counsel and obtain the dissolution of the marriage. The parties 
entered into a written stipulation and property settlement 
agreement codifying the resolution of all issues incident to 
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divorce. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The parties also agreed to waive the ninety day waiting 
period. The Defendant requested and obtained statements from his 
health care providers justifying the waiver of the waiting period. 
A default divorce hearing was held before the Honorable Frank Noel 
on December 3, 1991. The Decree of Divorce was granted and became 
final on December 3, 1991, approximately seventy eight days after 
the complaint for divorce was filed. 
On July 30, 1992 the Defendant filed a motion for relief from 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
III. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Judge Noel heard oral argument from the counsel for the 
parties and then took the matter under advisement. On March 17, 
1993 Judge Noel issued a Minute Entry denying the Defendant the 
relief he sought. 
IV. LODGING OF THIS APPEAL. 
The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on April 14, 1993. On 
April 23, 1993 the Plaintiff filed an Exception To Appeal Bond and 
Motion to Dismiss Appeal. The Motion to Dismiss Appeal was denied. 
That appeal is now before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant has, in his opening brief, given a recitation of 
facts he believes are accurate. Rather than reiterate what has been 
previously sworn to and placed into evidence at the District Court 
3 
level and what has been recited to the Court of Appeals the 
Plaintiff shall only correct misstatements made by the Defendant in 
his brief and shall selectively supplement the Defendant's 
recounted facts where appropriate. 
1. The written stipulation the Defendant now refers to as 
"putative" was premised upon a written directive to the Plaintiff 
which the Defendant voluntarily wrote, had notarized and then 
presented to the Plaintiff. (Appendix A). The primary deviations 
between this document and the subsequent written stipulation 
executed by the parties are the Defendant's financial obligations 
to the parties' children. 
2. The Defendant misstates the content of the statements from 
his health care providers. (Defendant's Appendix C). There is 
nothing in either statement which indicates the "defendant suffered 
from a mental illness or defect...". Rather these documents verify 
that a suggestion was made to the Defendant to seek the assistance 
of a mental health counselor to address his use of alcohol. 
There is nothing in the record other than the Defendant's 
self-serving, specious allegations that the "... defendant suffered 
from a mental illness or defect and/or problems involving substance 
abuse, such that he was incapable of entering a binding contract in 
the autumn of 1991". The Defendant's health care providers made no 
indication that the Defendant was ill-advised much less incapable 
of handling his affairs or entering into a binding contract. In 
fact no manifestations of alarm or concern were raised about the 
Defendant's assertions to his health care providers that he was 
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divorcing or that his divorce was uncontested. 
The Defendant's activities also negate any allegation that he 
was too incapacitated to handle personal or business affairs. As 
the Plaintiff stated in her affidavit in opposition to the request 
for relief from judgment, the Defendant, sxibsequent to the filing 
for divorce, represented himself at trial arising from a DUI arrest 
in Moab, Utah which occurred in June 1991. He had also engaged in 
numerous business activities despite his reliance upon alcohol as 
an anesthetic. (Appendix B). 
3. The Plaintiff refuted each and every "fact" cited by the 
Defendant as grounds for relief from the Decree of Divorce in her 
affidavit in opposition to the Defendant's motion. (Appendix B). 
These factual denials include: 
a. The Plaintiff never informed the Defendant the divorce was 
an artifice to avoid any contingent liabilities resulting from an 
automobile accident he had. Rather, the Defendant was adamant that 
there be a divorce and that it be final before the end of the 
calendar year as he was anticipating the receipt of a large 
settlement from his Worker's Compensation claim which he wished to 
retain as his sole and separate property. He wished the divorce 
finalized before receipt of the anticipated monies to minimize his 
tax liabilities and to claim sole ownership of his expected 
remuneration. 
b. The parties had effectively led separate lives for a 
significant amount of time. The Plaintiff did not indicate to the 
Defendant they would continue to be husband and wife. 
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c. The Plaintiff and Defendant did not continue to act as 
husband and wife after the dissolution of their marriage. The 
property in Colorado was purchased after the Defendant could not 
qualify on his own to purchase the same and after he convinced the 
Plaintiff to invest with him. The Plaintiff retained her married 
name after the divorce. Thus, the real estate documents bear 
identical surnames of the purchasers. However, identical surnames 
are not an indicia of a marital relationship. 
The Plaintiff did notify her employer that she was divorced. 
She does not know why they still listed him as an insured party on 
her medical insurance. However, after her job transfer to Colorado 
in January 1992 the Plaintiff secured health insurance for her and 
her children only. 
The Plaintiff stated the Defendant was travelling most of the 
time prior to the divorce and thereafter. He did store personal 
property at her residence but they were not living together. 
The Defendant refused to convey title of the vehicles to the 
Plaintiff. ( In fact he still has yet to convey title or possession 
of the Honda). When the Plaintiff relocated to Colorado she 
obtained insurance on her vehicle for herself only. 
The Plaintiff stated that the parties had joint personal 
banking accounts as a matter of convenience during the marriage. 
However, they each exclusively utilized separate accounts. The 
Defendant continued to use the account he had used during the 
marriage after December 1991. The Plaintiff knew she was 
relocating. She thought of one account as hers. This account was 
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closed after she moved. Thereafter she did not have a joint account 
with the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff signed her apartment lease when she relocated. 
Only her signature is on the lease she negotiated. (Appendix C). 
The Defendant later contacted her apartment complex' property 
manager and placed his name on the Plaintiff's lease. The Court is 
requested to compare the two copies of the lease which have been 
submitted. As noted, the Plaintiff's name only appears on her copy. 
The Defendant's lease verifies he executed the same after the date 
the Plaintiff rented her apartment. 
REBUTTAL TO SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion 
for relief from judgment. There are no extreme facts and 
circumstances in this matter as alleged by the Defendant. The 
Defendant's motion for relief and this appeal are nothing more than 
an effort by the Defendant to manufacture reasons why he should not 
be bound by the Decree of Divorce because he became disenchanted 
with the bargain he made, an effort to manipulate the judicial 
system and continuing harassment of the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff has adamantly denied that there was any fraud 
perpetrated by her either upon the Defendant or the Court. The 
Plaintiff did seek a dissolution of her marriage in good faith. The 
parties stipulated to an equitable division of their personal 
property, real property and debts and resolved all other issues, 
such as custody, child support and visitation, incident to divorce. 
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The Court approved their stipulation and granted their divorce. 
As stated in Haner v. Haner. 373 P.2d 577 (Utah 1962) at pages 
579 and 580: 
"... It is plainly apparent here that there has been 
no actual reconciliation, but the feud which existed 
between the parties prior to, and during the divorce 
trial continues. The purported reconciliation appears 
at best only a forlorn hope of one of the parties, or 
perhaps it is but another tactic in attempting to gain 
economic advantage. It certainly does not represent a 
realistic appraisal of the relationship between them."... 
The Defendant's untrue claims of fraud upon him are knowingly 
false representations designed to cast the Plaintiff in an 
undeserved defensive posture, to elicit undeserved sympathy for him 
and to attempt to obtain relief to which he is clearly not 
entitled. The Defendant's untrue claims of fraud upon the Court 
are unwarranted attempts to prejudice the Plaintiff7 standing with 
the Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Haner, infra, discussed the concept 
of fraud in divorce matters. The Court, at pages 578 an 579 stated: 
"However, inasmuch as the Plaintiff here seems to be 
relying on the grounds of fraud there is a distinction 
which is necessary to point out. In order to justify 
granting relief, the alleged wrong would have to be of 
the type characterized as extrinsic fraud: that is fraud 
based on conduct or activities outside of the court 
proceedings themselves;and which is designed and has 
the effect of depriving the other party of the 
opportunity to present his claim or defense. This type 
of fraud, which is regarded as a fraud not only upon the 
opponent, but upon the court itself, can be accomplished 
in a number of ways, such as making false statements or 
representations to the other party or to witnesses to 
prevent them from contesting the issues; or by that 
means or otherwise preventing the attendance of the 
parties or witnesses; or by destroying or secreting 
evidence; so that a fair trial of the issues is 
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effectively prevented." 
Nothing the Plaintiff did constituted fraud as she did not 
make any false statements or representations to the Defendant which 
prevented him from contesting the evidence, nor did she destroy or 
secret evidence. The Defendant identified the outcome he desired 
well before the Plaintiff initiated the action for divorce and well 
before the parties executed the written stipulation and property 
settlement agreement. (Appendix A). Moreover, the Defendant was 
informed of his right to seek legal representation and executed an 
Acceptance of Service and Appearance indicating an understanding of 
his rights. (Exhibit D to Appendix B). The Defendant voluntarily 
affirmed the process he initiated. No fraud was ever perpetrated 
upon him or the trial court by the Plaintiff. 
However, assuming arguendo, that Plaintiff did perpetrate 
fraud, either extrinsic or intrinsic, the Defendant was barred from 
seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure after the expiration of three months from the date the 
Decree of Divorce was entered. The sections of Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which govern motions premised in 
fraud are: 
11
 On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order or proceeding for the following reasons: ... 
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party.... (7).... The motion shall be made within 
a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), 
not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken.".... 
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The three month time limit imposed upon the bringing of a 
motion for relief from judgment has been repeatedly upheld by the 
appellate courts of this state. In St. Pierre v. Edmondsf 645 P.2d 
615 (Utah 1982) at pages 617 and 618 the Utah Supreme Court held: 
11
 Rule 60(b) authorizes the trial court, on motion, 
to relieve a party from a final judgment or decree 
procured by fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, 
but only if the motion is made within three months 
after the judgment. ... 
Nonetheless, even when there is fraud in obtaining a 
judgment, there must be some time limit on the bringing 
of an action to set the judgment aside."... 
The reasons for strict adherence to the three month time limit 
are applicable to this case. As noted in Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 
1114 ( Utah App. 1989), page 1117, there must be finality to 
judgments. Citing Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) the Court 
stated: 
11
 (W)hen a decree is based upon a property settlement 
agreement, forged by the parties and sanctioned by the 
court, equity must take such agreement into 
consideration. Equity is not available to reinstate 
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away 
simply because one has come to regret the bargain 
made. Accordingly, the law limits the continuing 
jurisdiction of the court where a property 
settlement agreement has been incorporated into the 
decree and the outright abrogation of the provisions 
of such an agreement is only to be resorted to with 
great reluctance and for compelling reasons." ... 
Categorically, there was no fraud perpetrated by the Plaintiff 
upon either the Defendant or the Court. Judge Noel had no 
authority to apply any time restriction other than the three month 
time limit upon the Defendant/s motion for relief from judgment. 
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The decision denying the Defendant's motion for relief was legally 
accurate and should not be disturbed upon appeal. 
There is no medical testimony or evidence from a mental health 
counselor that the Defendant suffered from any mental illness 
immediately prior to the execution of the written property 
settlement agreement, the date the divorce was finalized or the 
date the Defendant filed the motion for relief. If indeed the 
Defendant is relying upon the findings which granted his 
application for social security disability payments he has again 
grossly misconstrued the same. The hearing officer found: "... At 
the hearing, the medical expert testified that the claimant 
suffered from a personality disorder. He testified that the 
claimant' (sic) inflexible and maladaptive personality traits were 
evidenced by pathologically inappropriate suspiciousness or 
hostility, oddities of thought, persistent disturbances of mood, 
pathological dependence, passivity or aggressivity, and intense and 
unstable personal relationships. The medical expert testified that 
the claimant's disorder resulted in moderate restrictions of daily 
living activities, marked difficulties in maintaining social 
functioning, frequent deficiencies of concentration and continual 
episodes of deterioration." In the words of the medical expert, who 
testified on or about March 11, 1991 the Defendant's condition 
resulted in only moderate restrictions of daily living 
activities.(Exhibit A to Defendant's Appendix B). 
Neither the physician's assistant nor the medical doctor who 
examined the Defendant in September 1991 and October 1991 indicated 
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that the Defendant was incapacitated and incapable of functioning 
either because of alcohol abuse or mental illness. Their concerns 
about the Defendant's use of alcohol to diminish his physical pain 
are consistent with the noted moderate restriction in daily living 
activities and frequencies of concentration due to inebriety. 
However, neither the concerns of the health care providers employed 
by FHP or the expert who testified at the disability claim hearing 
indicated that the Defendant was incapacitated or debilitated by a 
mental illness. 
The Defendant has attempted to self-diagnose the condition 
caused by his alcohol use, exaggerate the same and give self-
serving statements regarding his alleged mental illness and 
incapacitation in an attempt to be relieved from the provisions of 
the Decree of Divorce. The Defendant did not present credible 
evidence of his alleged mental illness. His erroneous 
characterization of medical testimony given in a different tribunal 
for a totally different purpose and the statements he obtained to 
facilitate waiver of the ninety day waiting period do not 
substantiate the Defendant's belief that he suffers from a 
debilitating mental illness. The lower court was correct in 
rejecting the Defendant's claimed incapacity. 
The trial properly applied the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the Defendant's motion for relief 
from judgment. The Defendant was very much capable of negotiating 
and stipulating to the terms of the divorce. He absolutely was in 
control of his actions. The Defendant's motion for relief was 
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untimely. The lower court properly recognized its inherent 
inability to consider the Defendant's motion for relief from 
judgment. This Court is respectfully requested not to disturb the 
ruling of the lower court as the same is legally accurate and does 
not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
However, assuming arguendo. that the Defendant was suffering 
from a mental illness the alleged mental condition would still not 
entitle him to circumvent the three month time limitation imposed 
by Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Defendant had been consuming alcohol as a surrogate pain killer for 
many years. He had obviously had some type of psychological 
examination as an expert testified at the disability claim hearing 
regarding the Defendant's personality disorder. It should be noted 
that the expert's testimony identified only a personality disorder, 
which did not greatly impede or hinder the Defendant's ability to 
function, and not a debilitating or incapacitating mental illness. 
There is absolutely no way the Defendant could not be aware of 
his health. Only he introduced alcohol into his system at the times 
and places he selected. The parties have each indicated the 
Defendant did exercise control in the use and abstention from 
alcohol. 
The Defendant acknowledged he was informed that he had the 
right to have an attorney represent him. The fact that he had been 
deemed physically disabled, utilized alcohol and had a personality 
disorder were all known to him. He can not now claim that he may 
have failed to act prudently to protect his rights and should have 
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been afforded the protection offered in Section 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Some of the recognizable reasons 
articulated in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
particularly mistake and inadvertence and arguably excusable 
neglect are applicable to the Defendant's situation. The holding of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 
1977) is controlling. Specifically, at pages 173 and 174, the Court 
held: 
" It seems inescapable, also# to conclude that Rule 
60(b)(1) is applicable here in the letter and spirit 
of rules governing procedure and practice and the 
doctrine of the exercise of diligence in the 
presentation of one's rights, failing which they are 
amenable to a limitations statutory feature looking to 
repose of litigation after a reasonable time, interdicted 
here to be three months under Rule 60(b)(1). " 
The Defendant asserts that because of his mental condition he 
was unable to enter into a binding contract. This specious argument 
confuses the issue of a void and a voidable contract. Assuming only 
for the purpose of argument that the Defendant was inhibited 
because of a mental condition any contract he entered into while 
incapacitated may be capable of being voided. It is not, however, 
ab initio, void. Had the Defendant desired to void the property 
settlement agreement and negate operation of the Decree of Divorce 
he would have had to do so in a timely matter. The Court of Appeals 
has held that a desire to be relieved from a stipulation because 
one did not understand the consequences of the same is governed by 
the three month time limitation. The Court stated in Richins v. 
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Delbert Chipman & Sons Company, 817 P.2d 382 (Ut. App. 1991) at 
page 386: 
" Chipman argues that Rule 60(b)(7), rather than (1) 
applies to his case. However, we find that Chipman's 
claim that he mistakenly entered into an ill-advised 
stipulation without fully understanding its consequences 
is correctly characterized as mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). (citations 
omitted). Therefore, the trial court was correct in 
concluding that any relief sought under Rule 60(b) would 
have to be pursuant to subsection (1)." 
Clearly the three month time limitation applied to the 
Defendant's motion for relief from judgment. The Defendant did not 
act diligently to protect his rights. The trial court's denial of 
the relief sought by the Defendant was proper. This Court should 
affirm the decision of the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
The Defendant's contention that "... Rule 60(b) specifically 
recognizes that a party's fraud upon the court in obtaining 
judgment may constitute a unique circumstance under which the court 
may need to consider the party's conduct outside the other time 
limits of Rule 60(b)." is clearly a misstatement of the law. Rule 
60(b)(3) and Rule 60(b)(7) afford a party relief from judgment if 
predicated upon fraud, either intrinsic or extrinsic, if the motion 
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for relief from judgment is brought "not more than three months 
after the j udgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." The 
stated three month time limit is an absolute bar to an untimely 
motion for relief from judgment, Haner v. Haner. 373 P.2d 577 (Utah 
1962), Bovce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980) and St. Pierre v. 
Edmonds. 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982). 
Contrary to the assertion of the Defendant adherence to the 
three month time limit from the date of the final order rather than 
the date the party discovers the fraud does make sense. Allowing 
the time limit to run as the Defendant would suggest as being 
sensible would circumvent the stated time limitation for no 
justifiable reason, would allow multiple litigations and would 
destroy the finality of judgments and the doctrine of res 
adiudicata. The Court in Boyce, infra, provides an excellent 
discussion of the difficulties a motion for relief from judgment 
presents. This case unfortunately demonstrates the realities faced 
by a party who must not only endure the difficulty of the initial 
proceedings but must suffer the economic, financial and emotional 
hardships created by a second action initiated by the other party 
to the action who becomes disgruntled, may be unreasonably 
litigious or simply desires to harass the other party. In light of 
the hardships and stress this Plaintiff has endured subsequent to 
the filing of the motion for relief the strict adherence to a three 
month time limitation is neither unreasonable nor unwarranted. 
The Plaintiff emphatically and categorically denies she 
perpetrated a fraud either upon the Court or the Defendant. As 
16 
verified in her affidavit and the documents submitted to the lower 
Court the "facts" relied upon by the Defendant for the relief 
requested in his Rule 60(b) motion were inaccurate. The allegations 
were uttered with the intent to mislead the Court and to possibly 
obtain relief to which he was not entitled. The lower Court, 
however, did not have the authority or the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the credibility of the allegations as the parameters of 
the applicable time limit in Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure precluded the same. Richins. supra. As is noted 
elsewhere in Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
controlling cases, such as St. Pierre v. Edmonds, supra. the bar 
created by the three month time limit does not preclude a party 
from bringing an independent action to modify the final judgment or 
decree. 
The lower Court correctly determined that the Defendant's 
motion for relief was not entitled to the more ambiguous 
"reasonable" time limitation of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Defendant was precluded from application of 
the arguably greater time within to bring a motion encompassed in 
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as the 
provisions of Rule 60(b)l), 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3) governed his 
motion which was predicated upon allegations of fraud but in 
actuality constituted avowals of negligence and lack of due 
diligence. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Company, supra. In 
Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Southern Properties. 838 
P. 2d 672 ( Utah App. 1992) this Court upheld the standards 
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established in Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n.. 657 
P. 2d 1304 (Utah 1982) which a moving party must meet to be afforded 
relief under equitable standards of Rule (60)(b)(7) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court stated, at pages 674 and 675: 
"As the residuary clause of Rule 60(b), subsection (7) 
embodies three requirements for relief: "First, that the 
reason be one other than those listed in subdivisions (1) 
through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and 
third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time." 
(citations omitted) Subsection (7) "should be very 
cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court only in 
unusual and exceptional instances", (citations omitted) 
Furthermore, subsection (7) may not be employed for 
relief when the grounds asserted are encompassed within 
subsection (1). (citations omitted) Otherwise, the three 
month time limitation for filing motions pursuant to 
subsection (1) would be circumvented, 
(citations omitted). " 
The Defendant was clearly not entitled to application of the 
more liberal provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as he failed to meet any of the three conditions 
precedent. The Defendant alleged fraud in his petition. Allegations 
of fraud are clearly governed by Rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the three month time limitation imposed in Rule 
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The relief the Defendant was seeking was not justified. The 
terms of the stipulation and the Decree of Divorce were neither 
inequitable, contrary to the provisions of applicable statutes, 
such as Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
or unduly onerous to the Defendant. (Decree of Divorce, Appendix D 
and Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition to Request for Relief from 
Judgment, Appendix A.) The Defendant was not justified in seeking 
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to be relieved from the terms of the agreement he knowingly and 
voluntarily entered into or to alter or modify the same. Moreover, 
to afford relief to the Defendant as requested would cause 
unquantifiable unfairness and harm to the Plaintiff. The new life 
she created as well as the stability and certainty created by and 
enforceable because of the Decree of Divorce would be jeopardized 
and possibly eradicated. 
Finally, the motion was not made within a reasonable amount of 
time. This motion was filed nearly eight months after the Decree of 
Divorce was entered and nearly a year after the parties' final 
separation. There have been numerous attempts by courts to define 
"reasonable time". Admittedly, this is a subjective criteria. 
However, in Laub, supra. and Peck v. Cook. 510 P.2d 530 (Utah 1973) 
delays of more than six months from the date of the final order to 
the date of the filing of the motion for relief from judgment were 
deemed unreasonable. Certainly, this Plaintiff and other parties to 
actions should be entitled to feel secure with their judgments as 
soon as possible and practicable. 
Issue is taken with the Defendant's statement that the 
Defendant filed his motion for relief from judgment within two 
months after the "plaintiff finally revealed to him her scheme to 
obtain the lion's share of the marital assets without dispute. 
There certainly was no scheme, artifice, plan or fraudulent act by 
the Plaintiff to obtain the lion's share of the marital assets. The 
Defendant again has asserted an illusory, untrue belief as fact and 
premised a fatally illogical argument upon the same. The Defendant 
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can not claim to have filed a motion for relief within two months 
after an event or series of events that never occurred. The 
Defendant's motion was filed many, many, many months after the 
Decree was entered. The delayed filing is unreasonable, even if the 
Defendant were able to meet the other criteria for relief under 
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The three time constraints of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure have been repeatedly lauded as being necessary 
to establish finality to the litigation. Lincoln, supra, Russell, 
supra, and Laub, supra. As the Court stated in Laub, supra, at page 
1308: 
"The time strictures of Rule 60(b) are wholesome and 
necessary, for there must be an end to the time when 
judgments can be questioned, (citations omitted) "There 
must be an end to litigation someday, and free, 
calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved 
from.") Furthermore, since subdivision (1) is applicable 
to the instant case, subdivision (7) can not be used to 
circumvent the three-month filing period, 
(citations omitted). " 
The Defendant appears to have sought relief pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(7) in an effort to circumvent the three month time limitation 
applicable to fraud and other enumerated grounds. However, refuge 
in this section is not permissible when other sections of the rule 
are applicable and controlling. Richins, supra, Calder Brothers 
Company v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982), Russell, supra, 
Pitts, supra and Gardiner, supra. 
Judge Noel in his minute entry also determined that the 
Defendant's motion was not filed within a reasonable time even if 
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the three month time limit did not apply. The ruling of the lower 
court was not an abuse of discretion and should not be reversed by 
this Court. Russell, supra and Baker, supra. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court order the 
Defendant to pay the costs and actual attorney fees she has 
incurred herein. The Defendant filed the motion for relief from 
judgment and this appeal in bad faith as he knew his allegations 
were meretricious. The Defendant had vowed to make certain the 
Plaintiff's financial security and peace of mind were destroyed. 
The tenacious litigiousness of the Defendant has been costly to the 
Plaintiff. She has been required to expend a considerable amount of 
time, energy and effort to defend herself. The toll taken has been 
substantial. 
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RESOLDTION 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests an expedited resolution of 
this appeal. There is a balloon payment due on the rental property 
she was awarded in the underlying divorce action. The Defendant did 
has not sufficiently conveyed title to her so that she can either 
sell the property or refinance the same. Moreover, the Defendant 
has ben occupying the rental unit. The parties have not agreed on 
how to address the upcoming balloon payment. 
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CONCLDSION 
This brief argues in detail that the trial court did not err 
in refusing to grant the Defendant relief pursuant to any provision 
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rationale 
for the lower Court's decision are adequately supported by the 
affidavits and documents submitted to the Court and the record. 
The Defendant failed to file his motion for relief within a 
reasonable amount of time much less the applicable three month time 
limit. The basis for the Defendant's motion were not so unusual or 
compelling as to afford him the more liberal consideration afforded 
in Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to sustain the ruling of 
the lower Court. 
Respectfully submitted this fcxh day of December 1993. 
Carolyn^Driscoll 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Cecelia Scafide 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's brief and two copies of the addendum were hand 
delivered on the £th day of December 1993 to Mary Corporon, the 
attorney for the Defendant/Appellant, 310 South Main Street, Suite 
1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
22 
^j/e^^^/ ^<4€*&<L0^/ 
